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A Bright Idea: A Bright-Line Test for
Extraterritoriality in F-Cubed Securities
Fraud Private Causes of Action
Jennifer Mitchell Coupland*
Abstract: Whether a foreign or American claimant has a private right of action
in so-called ―Foreign-Cubed‖ or ―Foreign-Squared‖ claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 has been the subject of much debate
among U.S. courts, Congress, and the international community. Historically,
these cases have been heard in the United States if the conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or on U.S. citizens (the effects test), or if the
fraudulent or wrongful conduct occurred in the United States (the conduct test).
However, in June 2010, the United States Supreme Court struck down both of
these tests in favor of a transactional test.
While the Supreme Court seemingly resolved many questions surrounding
extraterritorial issues inherent in securities class action suits with its adoption
of this transactional test, Congress may have re-opened the issue with the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. This article argues that Congress and the SEC
should limit the extraterritoriality of the Exchange Act on private securities
fraud litigation. Additionally, this article argues that both Congress and the
SEC should provide courts with a bright-line rule regarding the extraterritorial
reach of the Exchange Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a foreign or American claimant has a private right of action in
so-called ―Foreign-Cubed‖1 or ―Foreign-Squared‖2 claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (Exchange Act) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-54 has been the
subject of much debate among U.S. courts, Congress, and the international
community. Historically, these cases have been heard in the United States
if the conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or on U.S.
citizens (the effects test), or if the fraudulent or wrongful conduct occurred
in the United States (the conduct test).5 However, in June 2010, the United
States Supreme Court struck down both of these tests in favor of a
transactional test, which looks to one of two factors: (1) ―whether the
purchase or sale [of the security] is made in the United States,‖ or (2)
whether the security is listed on a U.S. exchange. 6
While the Supreme Court seemingly resolved many questions
surrounding extraterritorial issues inherent in securities class action suits
with its adoption of this transactional test, Congress may have re-opened

1

Foreign-Cubed is a term used to define transactions in which foreign shareholders
purchase stock of a foreign issuer on a foreign exchange. Seth Aronson et al., Developments
and Trends in Securities Litigation: 2009–10, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT
2010, at 363, 387 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1832, 2010).
2
Foreign-Squared is a term used to define transactions in which U.S. shareholders
purchase stock of a foreign issuer on a foreign exchange. See Louis M. Solomon, Court
Dismisses Both ―Foreign Cubed‖ as Well as ―Foreign Squared‖ Securities Claims Based on
Morrison, CADWALADER INT‘L PRAC. L. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2011), http://blog.
internationalpractice.org/international-practice/court-dismisses-both-foreign-cubed-as-wellas-foreign-squared-securities-claims-based-on-morrison.html.
3
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78 et seq.).
4
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
5
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Law: Managing
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 14, 21–23 (2007).
6
Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
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the issue with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. In July 2010, Congress
passed Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the SEC to
determine whether the provision for a private right of action for securities
fraud under the Exchange Act should extend to claims involving foreign
issuers.7 In addition, Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act creates
extraterritoriality in SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions. 8
This article argues that Congress and the SEC should limit the
extraterritoriality of the Exchange Act on private securities fraud litigation.
Additionally, this article argues that both Congress and the SEC should
provide courts with a bright-line rule regarding the extraterritorial reach of
the Exchange Act. Part II examines the current regulatory and judicial
landscape of securities fraud private litigation. Included in this is a
discussion of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the recent Supreme
Court decision that struck down both the conduct and effects tests. Part III
discusses what, if any, effect the Dodd-Frank Act will have on the Supreme
Court‘s decision in Morrison. Part IV examines the factors that the SEC
should consider when determining whether to apply extraterritoriality in
civil actions for securities fraud. These factors include the legislative
history of securities fraud litigation, the policy reasons both for and against
a finding of extraterritoriality, the international consequences of such a
finding, and the economic consequences of extraterritoriality. This section
concludes that, based on an analysis of these factors, the SEC should limit
the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to cases that meet the
transactional test defined above. Finally, Part V concludes that the SEC
should not recommend that Rule 10b-5 be modified to allow for
extraterritoriality, but that the SEC should instead establish a bright-line
rule such as the one adopted by the Court in Morrison.
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF SECURITIES FRAUD
LITIGATION
Foreign-Cubed, or ―F-Cubed,‖ is a term used to define transactions in
which foreign shareholders purchase stock of a foreign issuer on a foreign
exchange.9 Foreign-Squared, or ―F-Squared,‖ litigation, similar to FCubed, involves transactions on a foreign exchange involving a foreign
issuer.10 However, unlike F-Cubed transactions, the purchaser is a U.S.
citizen.11
In 2011 a total of sixty-one federal securities class actions were filed

7

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
929Y, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010).
8
Id. § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1841–49.
9
Aronson et al., supra note 1, at 387.
10
Solomon, supra note 2.
11
Id.
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against foreign issuers—a more than 50% increase from the twenty-seven
filed in 2010.12 Surprisingly, the number of cases increased significantly
after the Morrison decision, with sixteen of the twenty-seven cases in 2010
filed after the June 2010 decision.13
A study released by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) points to a number of factors that could
help explain this surprising increase. 14 First, PwC stated that the increase
was largely attributable to Chinese companies.15 In 2011, thirty-seven of
the sixty-one and in 2010, twelve of the twenty-seven cases filed against
foreign investors were filed against Chinese companies. 16 The complaints
in a number of these cases included claims that the ―revenue and profit
figures reported in SEC filings were considerably different from those
reported to Chinese authorities.‖17 Second, PwC observed that the increase
could be due to a few high-profile events that resulted in litigation against
foreign issuers, such as BP and Transocean.18
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Exchange Act created the SEC and granted it the authority to
enforce U.S. securities regulations. 19 Included in this authority is ―the
power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents,
and clearing agencies as well as the nation‘s securities self regulatory
organizations (SROs).‖20 The Exchange Act requires companies with
12

PATRICIA A. ETZOLD & NEIL KEENAN, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, THE EVERCHANGING LANDSCAPE OF LITIGATION COMES FULL CIRCLE: 2011 SECURITIES LITIGATION
STUDY 3, 5 (2012), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/2011_SECURITIES_
LITIGATION_STUDY_14_INTERACTIVE.PDF.
GRACE LAMONT & NEIL KEENAN,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, LOOKING BEYOND A DECADE OF FRAUD, CORRUPTION, AND
TURMOIL: 2010 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 42 (2011), available at
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-11-0484%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_V6BONLINE.PDF.
A total of thirty-six cases were brought against foreign issuers in 2008. GRACE LAMONT &
PATRICIA A. ETZOLD, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 35
(2010), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-10-0559%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY
_V7%20PRINT.PDF.
13
LAMONT & KEENAN, supra note 12, at 42.
14
Id. at 42–51.
15
Id. at 43.
16
ETZOLD & KEENAN, supra note 12, at 3; LAMONT & KEENAN, supra note 12, at 42.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 44. Both BP and Transocean were the subject of several class actions whose
complaints charged both companies with violations of the Exchange Act for the
dissemination of false and misleading statements about deficient safety protocols and their
operating and safety record. Id.
19
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. at 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78d (2006)); The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (last modified Feb. 15,
2012).
20
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 19 (defining self-regulatory
organizations as including the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
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publicly traded securities to follow certain corporate reporting and
disclosure requirements.21 It also prohibits certain behavior, such as
securities fraud, and grants specific disciplinary authority over companies
and individuals that fall within its regulatory powers. 22
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 prohibit securities
fraud.23 And, while they do not explicitly prohibit or allow plaintiffs to
bring a private cause of action in U.S. courts involving foreign securities,
foreign transactions, foreign issuers, and foreign purchasers, courts have
historically heard such cases. 24 The Securities Act of 1933 states in its
provision on jurisdiction that:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of
offenses and violations under this subchapter and under the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto . . . of
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this subchapter. Any such suit or action may be
brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or
sale took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process in
such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant
is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.25

In addition, the language in Rule 10b-5, which provides even less
clarity, states that it is unlawful for any person to use any ―means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . or of any facility of any national
securities exchange‖ to carry out a deceptive act. 26 Because the language in
the Exchange Act is ambiguous as to whether F-Cubed or F-Squared claims
have standing in the United States, this determination has largely been left

Exchange).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
24
See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995); IIT v. Vencap Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
25
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 86 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(2006)); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 48 Stat. at 902–03 (codified at .15
U.S.C. § 78aa) (setting forth the jurisdictional rules of the Exchange Act).
26
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). Section 10(b) provides that
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
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to the courts. This has resulted in unpredictable, inconsistent, and often
over-reaching decisions.
Courts have traditionally applied one of two tests to justify making
such a determination: the conduct test or the effects test.27 The conduct test
looks to ―whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.‖28
The effects test looks to ―whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.‖29 However,
courts often apply these two tests inconsistently.30
1. The Conduct Test
The conduct test looks to where the fraudulent conduct takes place. 31
The level of conduct sufficient to establish U.S. jurisdiction is the subject of
much debate, though, and U.S. circuit courts are divided over the level of
conduct necessary to satisfy the test. 32 The Second Circuit first articulated
the conduct test in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,33
and then again applied the test in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, in which the
court held that the conduct test is satisfied when ―(1) the defendant‘s
activities in the United States were more than ‗merely preparatory‘ to a
securities fraud conducted elsewhere,‖34 and (2) the ―activities or culpable
failures to act within the United States ‗directly caused‘ the claimed
losses.‖35
While the Fifth and Seventh Circuits generally follow the Second
Circuit‘s test,36 the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have applied a looser

27

See, e.g., Itoba Ltd., 54 F.3d 118 (applying both the conduct and effects tests); Vencap
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (applying the effects test); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 468
F.2d 1326 (applying the conduct test); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d 200 (applying the effects test).
28
SEC v. Burger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
29
Id.
30
See Bertrand C. Sellier & Stacy Ceslowitz, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws;
Employment and Securities Laws, Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration,
PROSKAUER, http://www.proskauerguide.com/law_topics/25/IV (last visited Apr. 18, 2012)
(―Application of the conduct and effects test has not been consistent . . . .‖).
31
See Burger, 322 F.3d at 192.
32
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 207, 217 (1996).
33
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that the court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs‘
fraud claims even though the plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizens, purchased stock in a foreign
corporation, the corporation‘s stock was not traded on a U.S. exchange, and the trade was
executed by foreign brokers).
34
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995).
35
Id.; see also Burger, 322 F.3d at 187; IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
36
See, e.g. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1998); Robinson
v. TCI/US West Cable Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997).
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standard.37 The Second Circuit‘s test requires a finding that the foreign
defendant‘s conduct in the United States directly caused the plaintiff‘s
claimed losses.38 However, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits‘ test only
requires that the foreign defendant‘s conduct in the United States played a
significant role in the allegedly fraudulent conduct that caused the
plaintiff‘s claimed losses. 39 In Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, the
Eighth Circuit held that the court would find jurisdiction where the
domestic conduct ―was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was
significant with respect to its accomplishment.‖40 Conversely, the D.C.
Circuit has adopted perhaps the most stringent application of the conduct
test,41 requiring ―that all factors required to establish a securities fraud claim
under . . . Section 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] must have occurred in the
U.S.‖42
2. The Effects Test
In addition to the conduct test, the Second Circuit has also set forth a
test that looks to whether the allegedly fraudulent conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or on U.S. citizens. 43 Referred to as the effects
test, it is often applied in conjunction with the conduct test because,
historically, the effects test has been insufficient on its own. 44
The effects test was first articulated in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
where a court found jurisdiction based on the effect the transaction had on
American citizens and on American financial markets. 45 In Schoenbaum,
an American shareholder of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation, brought
37

See, e.g., Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (―Vigilant and
mature as our securities laws are, they are not to be invoked unless substantial steps in the
perpetuation of the fraud were taken here or the criminal conduct engaged in affected our
securities markets or American investors.‖); Cont‘l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420–21 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d
Cir. 1977).
38
Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
39
See, e.g., Butte Mining PLC, 76 F.3d at 291; Cont‘l Grain, 592 F.2d at 420–21; Kasser,
548 F.2d at 114.
40
Cont‘l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (finding that letters and telephone calls that took place in
the United States were sufficient to establish conduct ―in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme‖).
41
Sellier & Ceslowitz, supra note 30.
42
Id.; see also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that the conduct itself must violate section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5).
43
SEC v. Burger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
44
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (―There is no requirement
that these two tests be applied separately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, an
admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is
sufficient United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American
court. It is in this manner that we address the issue of jurisdiction in the instant case.‖).
45
405 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 32, at 217.
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a shareholder derivative suit to recover losses under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act against Aquitaine of Canada, Ltd., a wholly owned
subsidiary of a French corporation, and Paribas Corporation, a Delaware
corporation doing business in New York.46 Banff‘s stock was registered
with the SEC and traded on both the American Stock Exchange and the
Toronto Stock Exchange. 47 The allegedly fraudulent conduct took place
outside of the United States. 48 Although the district court dismissed the
case on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court‘s decision and held that even though the conduct occurred
entirely within Canada, the court had subject matter jurisdiction over cases
involving transactions that ―are detrimental to the interests of American
investors.‖49
Both the conduct and effects tests have governed extraterritoriality
questions in private securities fraud litigation since the 1970s. The
Supreme Court, however, in one fell swoop, nullified both tests when it
denied extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.50
B. Morrison: The Supreme Court Adopts a New Test
On June 24, 2010, the United States Supreme Court, in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, held that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
applies only to transactions involving domestic securities and to domestic
transactions of foreign securities. 51 In a unanimous ruling, the Court struck
down both the conduct and effects tests, stating that the statute provides no
textual support for such tests.52 The Court stated that ―it is [the Court‘s]
function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however modest
that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to
achieve.‖53
The petitioners in Morrison were Australian citizens who purchased
shares of National Australia Bank (National) on the Australian Stock
Exchange.54 National, the largest bank in Australia at the time of filing,
purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a U.S.-based mortgage
servicing company headquartered in Florida. 55 National‘s shares are traded
on the Australian Stock Exchange and on other foreign securities

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204.
Id.
Id.
Choi & Guzman, supra note 32, at 218.
Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Id. at 2884.
Id. at 2833.
Id. at 2886.
Id. at 2873.
Id. at 2875.
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exchanges, but not on any exchanges in the United States. 56 However,
National‘s shares of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are traded on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).57 In July 2001, National
announced that it was ―writing down the value of HomeSide‘s assets by
$450 million.‖58 Later, in September 2001, National announced that it was
writing down HomeSide‘s assets by $1.75 billion, a significant increase
from National‘s quote in July 2001.59
Based on the announcements in July and September, the petitioners
alleged that HomeSide and a number of its senior executives manipulated
its financial models ―to make the rates of early repayment unrealistically
low in order to cause the mortgage servicing rights to appear more valuable
than they really were.‖60 The petitioners claimed that National was aware
of this deception when it announced that it wrote down the value of
HomeSide‘s assets.61 The Second Circuit rejected the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),62
concluding that the conduct that occurred in Florida was merely a link in a
chain of conduct that ultimately took place in Australia.63
While the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit‘s dismissal of the
case, it rejected the lower court‘s reasoning. The Court stated that the case
should not have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
instead held that ―what conduct § 10(b) prohibits . . . is a merits question‖
analyzed more properly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(6).64 Thus, ―the proper question was whether the plaintiffs‘
allegations warranted relief.‖65
The Court also stated that where a statute is silent on extraterritoriality,
or where Congress has not directly expressed its intent for the statute to
56

Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2872.
Id. at 2875 (ADRs ―represent the right to receive a specified number of National‘s
Ordinary Shares.‖). More generally, ADRs are traded on a U.S. exchange and ―represent[]
ownership of equity shares in a foreign company.‖ Find Out About DRs, J.P.MORGAN,
https://www.adr.com/Education/AboutDRs (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (click DR Definitions
link).
58
Morrison, 130 S. Ct at 2875–76.
59
Id. at 2876.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 171–72 (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the ―conduct
amounted to, at most, a link in the chain of a scheme that culminated abroad‖).
63
Id. at 176 (―The actions taken and the actions not taken by NAB in Australia were, in
our view, significantly more central to the fraud and more directly responsible for the harm
to investors than the manipulation of the numbers in Florida.‖).
64
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (―Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, ‗refers to a
tribunal‘s power to hear a case.‘‖).
65
Vincent M. Chiappini, Note, How American Are American Depositary Receipts?
ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1795,
1802 (2011).
57
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apply extraterritorially, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality. 66
Because neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 addresses the extraterritorial
application of the rule, and Congress has not expressly stated its intent for
the statute to apply extraterritorially, the Court reasoned that there was a
presumption against such a finding. 67
Going one step further, the Court provided a framework under which
such suits should be decided. First, the Court rejected the conduct and
effects tests traditionally used in Foreign-Cubed cases.68 Second, the Court
adopted a transactional test. 69 The Court stated that whether there is a
private cause of action under Section 10(b) depends on whether the
purchase or sale of the security is made in the United States or whether the
security in the transaction is listed on a United States stock exchange. 70 In
Morrison, the plaintiffs did not meet the transactional test because their
shares were not purchased on a U.S. exchange.
C. Impact of Morrison
Within six months of the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Morrison, almost
200 courts had cited Morrison.71 In one of the earliest cases to apply the
transactional test outlined in Morrison, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, which involved
an F-Squared claim, held that Morrison applied to Foreign-Squared cases as
well as Foreign-Cubed cases.72 The court stated that the Exchange Act
―would not apply to transactions involving (1) a purchase or sale, wherever
it occurs, of securities listed only on a foreign exchange, or (2) a purchase
or sale of securities, foreign or domestic, which occurs outside the United
States.‖73
The plaintiffs in Cornwell consisted of two categories of investors:

66
Id.; see also Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm‘n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (―Legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‖).
67
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (―In short, there is no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does
not.‖).
68
Id. at 2884.
69
Id. at 2884, 2886 (stating that the effects test and the conduct test are not the proper
standards in Foreign-Cubed cases).
70
Id. at 2884.
71
Edward Pekarek & Anna Dokuchayeva, French Disconnection II –Fab‘s Failed FCubed Theory; Judge Jones Closes Morrison Doors on Goldman Exec, SEC. LITIG. & ARB.
(December 14, 2010, 8:25 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2010/12/
french_disconnection_ii_fabs_f.html; see, e.g., Plumbers‘ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund
v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse
Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
72
Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620.
73
Id. at 623–24.
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―(1) [investors] who purchased ADRs on the NYSE and (2) [investors] who
are U.S. residents who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock
Exchange.‖74 The plaintiffs contended that the U.S. securities laws applied
because their investment decision was made in the United States, they
―initiated a purchase of CSG[‗s stock] from the U.S.,‖ accepted the CSG
stock into their account in the United States, and ―incurred an economic risk
in the U.S.‖75 The plaintiffs also claimed that because the facts were not
synonymous with those in Morrison—the plaintiffs in Cornwell were U.S.
residents, unlike those in Morrison—the reasoning in Morrison should not
apply in the present case. 76 The court rejected this distinction, stating that
even if the applicable reasoning in Morrison was dictum, ―‗it does not at all
follow that [this Court] can cavalierly disregard it,‘ especially where the
Supreme Court ‗is providing a construction of a statute to guide the future
conduct of inferior courts.‘‖77 The district court emphasized that in looking
at the totality of the Morrison opinions, it was obvious that the Morrison
Court had not intended the anti-fraud provisions to extend to securities
traded on foreign exchanges, even if the securities were purchased or sold
by American investors. 78
In Plumber‘s Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance
Co., the plaintiffs alleged that Swiss Reinsurance Co. (Swiss Re) violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 ―by making false or
materially misleading disclosures about Swiss Re‘s risk management and
exposure to mortgage-related securities.‖79 Swiss Re is a Swiss corporation
whose stock is listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange. 80 While the purchase
order for the plaintiff‘s shares was placed in Chicago, the court emphasized
that the share transactions ―were executed, cleared, and settled on the virt-x
trading platform, which was a subsidiary of the SWX Swiss Exchange
based in London.‖81 Applying the holding in Morrison, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that ―a purchase order in the
United States for a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient
to subject the purchase to the coverage of section 10(b) of the Exchange

74

Samuel Wolff, The Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b): Morrison v. National
Australia Bank—Part 2, SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP., Apr. 2011. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs who had purchased their shares on the Swiss Stock exchange, but did not dismiss
the plaintiffs who had purchased ADRs on the NYSE. Id.
75
Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
76
See id. at 626 (pointing to the fact that the plaintiffs in Morrison were foreign citizens,
unlike the plaintiffs in Cornwell, who were American citizens).
77
Id. at 625 (citing United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975)).
78
Id. at 625–26.
79
Plumber‘s Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp.
2d 166, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
80
Id. at 171–72.
81
Id. at 166, 172.
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Act.‖82 The court rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that the purchase
occurred in the United States because the order for the stock had been
placed in the United States.83
The district court in In re Alstom SA Securities Litigation further
interpreted the ruling in Morrison, holding that it is not sufficient that the
securities are listed on a domestic exchange. 84 Rather, the transaction itself
must occur on a domestic exchange. 85 The plaintiffs in Alstom made two
arguments for application of Section 10(b): (1) the purchase of shares on
Euronext was initiated in the United States; and (2) the issuer had ADRs
listed on the NYSE, despite the fact that the purchase occurred on
Euronext.86 The court dismissed both of the plaintiffs‘ arguments, stating
that the ―the transactions themselves must occur on a domestic exchange to
trigger application of § 10(b).‖87
Critics of the decision in Morrison argue that the court failed to clearly
address whether Section 10(b) applies in cases where the securities in
question are ADRs. ADRs are ―vehicles for Americans to invest in foreign
corporations through an intermediary bank, which holds the actual foreign
security, and through which the investor receives an ADR representing his
ownership interest.‖88 Not all ADRs are listed on an exchange, but in
Morrison, the Court clearly stated that National‘s ADRs were traded on the
NYSE.89 The Court, however, seemed to overlook the issue of whether
ADRs listed on the NYSE are in fact listed on a domestic exchange. 90
―This renders inaccurate the Court‘s statement that the securities at issue in
82

Id. at 177–78.
Wolff, supra note 74 (―The Court rejected the arguments that the transaction was a
domestic one because the plaintiff is a US resident, made the decision in the United States,
suffered harm in the United States, and placed orders for the securities from the United
States. The Court held that citizenship and residency do not affect where a transaction
occurs.‖).
84
In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
85
Id. at 473.
86
Wolff, supra note 74.
87
In re Alstom SA Sec. Lit., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
88
Chiappini, supra note 65, at 1796.
89
Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010); see also Genevieve
Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of
the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 565 (2011).
90
See Beyea, supra note 89, at 564–65.
83

If a company lists ADRs on a national stock exchange, the ADRs (representing
American Depositary Shares, or ADSs) must be registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, and the
registration process typically involves the registration of two securities: the
underlying shares and the ADSs themselves. In addition, ordinary shares
underlying the listed ADRs are technically also listed on the exchange.
Id.
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Morrison were not registered on a domestic exchange, since technically the
[National] common stock underlying the ADRs was listed on the NYSE.‖91
Since Morrison, a number of courts have been faced with the issue of
whether Section 10(b) applies to cases where the securities are ADRs listed
on a domestic exchange. One such decision is Cornwell v. Credit Suisse,
where the court did not dismiss a case in which the plaintiffs had purchased
ADRs on the NYSE.92 Conversely, in In re Societe Generale Securities
Litigation, the court ruled that ADRs purchased on over-the-counter
markets in the United States were not covered by Section 10(b).93 These
two cases illustrate the confusion among district courts regarding not only
what ADRs are, but also how they work and how they are regulated.
The case law post-Morrison not only illustrates how lower courts have
applied the Supreme Court‘s holding, but also reveals some of the
weaknesses in the decision, as well as the uncertainties created by the
decision. The future of Morrison, however, is uncertain. While many in
the international community have embraced the decision in Morrison,
others, including members of Congress, have met it with significant
skepticism.94 Moreover, the recently-passed Dodd-Frank Act may severely
reduce the reach of Morrison.
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
On July 15, 2010, Congress approved House Resolution 4173, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act or Act), and President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into
law on July 21, 2010.95 The Act is considered by many to be the most
controversial and ―ambitious overhaul of financial regulation‖ since the
Great Depression.96 The Dodd-Frank Act‘s stated purpose is‖[t]o promote
91

Id. at 565–66.
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
93
In re Societe Generale Sec. Lit., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
94
See Luke Green, Foreign Pension Funds Call for Reversal of Morrison, INSIGHT:
SECURITIES LITIGATION (Mar. 17, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2011
/03/foreign-pension-funds-call-for-reversal-of-morrison.html (stating that, post-Morrison,
many of the pension funds‘ purchase of international equity investments would fall out of the
purview of U.S. courts).
95
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2012).
96
See Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST (July 16,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR20100715
00464.html; see also Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial
Landscape, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274
8704682604575369030061839958.html; Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Overhaul,
Pledges ‗No More‘ Bailouts, FOX NEWS (July 21, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
92
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the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‗too big to fail,‘ to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices, and for other purposes.‖97
Over 2,000 pages long, the Dodd-Frank Act affects almost all financial
regulatory agencies, including the SEC, contains over 200 rulemaking
provisions, and commissioned nearly 60 studies.98 Two provisions in the
Act, Section 929P and Section 929Y, address the extraterritorial reach of
federal securities laws.99
The first, Section 929P, establishes the
extraterritorial reach of the SEC and the Department of Justice in
enforcement actions. 100 This section modifies Section 22 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Section 27 of the Exchange Act, both of
which give federal district courts and state courts jurisdiction over
violations and offenses that arise under either one of the acts, but which did
not expressly address the extraterritorial application of the acts. 101
Modifying the two acts, Section 929P states that both federal and state
courts have jurisdiction over enforcement proceedings involving: ―(1)
conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside
the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect

politics/2010/07/21/obama-poised-sign-sweeping-financial-overhaul/.
97
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, pmbl., 124 Stat. at
1376.
98
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Shah Gilani, By Yanking the Teeth Out of Dodd-Frank Act
Ratings Rules, SEC Blunts Hope for Real Financial Reforms, MONEY MORNING (DEC. 1,
2010),
http://moneymorning.com/2010/12/01/dodd-frank-act-ratings-rules-sec-financialreforms/.
99
LAMONT & KEENAN, supra note 12, at 38; see, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act §§ 929P, 929Y 124 Stat. at 1862–65, 1871.
100
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at
1864–65.
101
See id. Section 22 of the Securities Act states that ―[t]he district courts of the United
States and United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and
violations under this title and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission.‖ Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 86 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
77v (2006)). Section 27 of the Exchange Act states that:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 22, 48 Stat. 881, 902 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (2006)).
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within the United States.‖102
The second provision, Section 929Y, requires the SEC to undertake a
study to determine whether private rights of action under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 should be extended to cover ―(1) conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of
the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside
the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States.‖103 In conducting the study, the Act states that the SEC should
consider, among other things, the scope of the private right of action, the
effect on international comity if the private right of action is modified to
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction, the economic costs and benefits of
such a modification, and the scope of the extraterritorial jurisdiction. 104
IV. FACTORS THE SEC SHOULD CONSIDER
The SEC should consider a number of factors when analyzing the
question of extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5. These factors include (1) the legislative history of private
litigation in Foreign-Cubed and Foreign-Squared cases, (2) the policy
reasons in support of extending jurisdictional reach, (3) the international
consequences of extraterritoriality, (4) the economic consequences of
extending extraterritoriality, and (5) the administrative consequences of
extending extraterritoriality. A consideration of these factors indicates that,
while the historical and policy justifications may be compelling reasons for
extending the jurisdictional reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, they do
not outweigh the international and economic consequences of such a
finding.
A. Legislative History
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, it clearly extended the
SEC‘s and the Department of Justice‘s jurisdictional reach in enforcement
actions to include securities transactions that occurred abroad if either the
conduct occurred in the United States or if the conduct occurred outside of
the United States but had a substantial effect on the United States. 105
However, the Dodd Frank Act does not explicitly extend jurisdiction to
American courts over private causes of action. 106 Thus, the question is
102

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at

1864.
103

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929Y, 124 Stat. at

1864.
104
105

Id.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at

1864.
106

See supra Part III for discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act.

555

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

32:541 (2012)

whether the SEC should look to the legislative record regarding the
enforcement powers of the SEC and the Department of Justice as proof that
Congress intended to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction in private causes of
action.
In a proceeding before the House of Representatives on June 30, 2010,
Representative Kanjorski, one of the drafters of Section 929P of the Act,
stated that the intention of the bill was to codify investors‘ ability to bring
causes of action under both the conduct test and the effects test. 107 He
stated:
In the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme
Court last week held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies
only to transactions in securities listed on United States exchanges
and transactions in other securities that occur in the United States. In
this case, the Court also said that it was applying a presumption
against extraterritoriality.
This bill‘s provisions concerning
extraterritoriality, however, are intended to rebut that presumption by
clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial application in
cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.108

Here, the legislative record is relevant in so much as it shows the
drafters of Dodd-Frank intended extraterritorial application to apply in SEC
and Justice Department enforcement cases only. Even though Section
929Y commissions the SEC to conduct a study regarding extraterritorial
application in private civil cases, the legislative intent behind Section 929P
should not be interrupted to support a recommendation for extraterritorial
application in non-enforcement cases.
B. Public Policy Considerations
The general deterrence of fraud and protection of purchasers of
securities are public policy factors that favor extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities law. One of the primary reasons given for extending
jurisdictional reach to Foreign-Cubed cases under Section 10(b) is that the
United States does not want to become a safe harbor for fraudulent activity.
It can be argued that the United States has the best class action system and,
thus, should litigate global class action suits. Proponents of this idea argue
that fear of a large settlement figure may deter companies from engaging in
fraudulent behavior.109 However, foreign nations have their own securities
regulations in place tailored to the needs and interests of their own

107

156 Cong. Rec. H5233 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski).
Id.
109
Peter M. Saparoff & Katherine Coughlin Beattie, The Benefits of Including Foreign
Investors in U.S. Securities Class Action Suits, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES, at 669, 671 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2008).
108
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citizens.110 Thus, though extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law
may contribute to preventing fraud, it is not necessary to achieving this
public policy goal.
C. International Consequences
Opponents to extraterritoriality in cases involving foreign issuers
whose shares are not traded on an American exchange often cite
international backlash as a primary reason for their opposition. If the
United States forces its laws on foreign companies, it may face international
backlash, including having American companies hailed into court in a
foreign jurisdiction or a decrease in foreign investment in the United
States.111 A number of factors, including the status of class action suits in
foreign jurisdictions, the securities laws regulating the foreign exchange on
which the foreign issuer‘s shares are traded, and the importance of state
sovereignty in regulating one‘s own corporations and exchanges, counsel
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. 112
1. Class Action Claims in Foreign Jurisdictions
The SEC‘s study should consider the procedural differences between
the United States and foreign jurisdictions. Such an analysis reveals that
legislative, cultural, economic, and political factors all influence a
jurisdiction‘s decision to permit or not permit class actions.
Unlike the United States, not all countries permit class action suits, and
some of the countries that do allow such suits have created systems that
differ from the United States class action system. 113 For example,
Switzerland does not permit class action suits, but provides alternative
remedies for group litigation. 114 Some of these remedies include devices
that allow ―similarly situated individuals [to] sue together,‖ allow an
―organization [to] sue for its members with similar rights,‖ and ―allow a
court to consolidate claims arising out of the same controversy.‖115 In fact,
Switzerland considered adopting the U.S.-style class action suit into its
Federal Code of Civil Procedure,116 but decided against it, ―noting that such
110

See infra Part IV.C.1.
See infra text accompanying notes 155–163.
112
See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland,
27 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 301, 303 (2007); Ted Allen, More Nations Open the Doors to
Securities Lawsuits, INSIGHT GOVERNANCE (March 7, 2006 9:27AM), http://blog.iss
governance.com/gov/2006/03/more-nations-open-the-door-to-securities-lawsuitssubmittedby-ted-allen-director-of-publications.html.
113
Allen, supra note 112.
114
Baumgartner, supra note 112, at 304.
115
Id. This differs from the class action available in the United States in that, in
Switzerland, all parties must actively participate in the action.
116
Id. at. 310 (citing Motion 98.3401, Jutzet Erwin, Einfuhrüng der Sammelklage im
111
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a device is foreign to Swiss traditions.‖117 In a message to Parliament, the
Swiss government stated that:
[It] is alien to European legal thought to allow somebody to exercise
rights on the behalf of a large number of people if these do not
participate as parties in the action. . . . Moreover, the class action is
controversial even in its country of origin, the U.S., because it can
result in significant procedural problems. . . . Finally, the class
action can be openly or discretely abused. The sums sued for are
usually enormous, so that the respondent can be forced to concede, if
they do not want to face sudden huge indebtedness and insolvency
(so-called legal blackmail).118

Switzerland is not the only country to decline to adopt a class action
device similar to that in the United States, and many of the countries that
also decline do so for many of the same reasons: economic, jurisdictional,
doctrinal, and cultural. 119 In the United Kingdom, for example, the
government has specifically decided against ―creat[ing] a general ‗opt-out‘
class action regime for securities litigation against issuers.‖120 Instead, the
United Kingdom has adopted more of an ―opt-in‖ procedure, whereby the
plaintiffs must choose to join an action. In addition, under the Group
Litigation Order, only named plaintiffs may bring a group action. 121
A number of countries, however, permit class action suits, including
Australia and Canada. 122 Australia has allowed securities class actions

Arbeits-, Miet- und Konsumentenrecht).
117
See id.
118
Botschaft zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnun (ZPO) [Message, the Swiss Code
of Civil Procedure], BBL 7221, 7290 (2006) (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch
/ch/d/ff/2006/7221.pdf.
119
Baumgartner, supra note 112, at 310–11 (―As in many other jurisdictions that have
contemplated the adoption of a class action device, proponents of such a device in
Switzerland face considerable doctrinal, jurisprudential, cultural, and economic objections.
Among them are a traditional focus on the individual nature of a claim; limitation of judicial
power vis-à-vis the legislature, thus disallowing the large-scale judicial discretion necessary
to manage complex litigation; strong emphasis on the litigants‘ right to be heard, which
would need to be slighted in complex cases; different respective roles of judges and
attorneys; lack of American-style fee structures and entrepreneurial lawyering; and the many
practical changes that would be necessary to introduce a class action device. Moreover,
there is a clear preference for legislation rather than litigation to deal with new social
problems, including mass torts.‖).
120
Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 12, Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)
(08-1191), 2010 WL 723009 [hereinafter Brief of the United Kingdom].
121
See Civil Procedure Rules: Part 19 – Parties and Group Litigation, r. 19.10–19.15,
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part19.htm (last updated Apr. 1,
2012).
122
Allen, supra note 113.
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since 1992,123 and as of 2008, nine out of ten of the Canadian provinces
permit class actions. In 1978, Quebec was the first province in Canada to
permit class actions similar to those in the United States, and in 1992,
Ontario began permitting class actions with the passage of the 1992 Class
Proceedings Act. 124 In December 2009, the Ontario Superior Court
certified the first class action involving secondary market disclosures in
Silver v. Imax.125
In Silver, the shareholders claimed that IMAX misrepresented
financial statements and brought a motion for a class action for secondary
market misrepresentation.126 The original plaintiffs were two IMAX
shareholders who purchased shares in IMAX on the Toronto Stock
Exchange before IMAX restated its financial disclosures. Additionally, the
two plaintiffs proposed to represent a global class of IMAX shareholders
who acquired their shares on a securities exchange and petitioned the court
for certification as a class proceeding.127 Justice K. van Rensburg of the
Ontario Supreme Court certified the class action and seemed to accept the
―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory, which Canadian courts had previously
rejected, by certifying the class.128
The SEC should consider these procedural differences between the
United States and foreign jurisdictions, especially as they pertain to class
actions, in deciding whether to allow extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities law. A jurisdiction‘s procedural rules reflect its economic,
political, and cultural ideologies. Disregarding these differences could
interfere with the regimes tailored to the interests and ideologies of foreign
nations and result in international backlash, in addition to causing economic
consequences. 129
2. Choice of Law
A corporation‘s choice of which law to subject itself to is an important
consideration in deciding whether U.S. securities law should apply
extraterritorially. Corporations purposely avail themselves of a specific
jurisdiction‘s laws when they decide to list their securities on that country‘s
exchange. It is unfair to force the laws of country A upon a party in country
B, especially when the party has purposely chosen not to conduct business
in country A. In Morrison, National‘s shares were traded on the Australian
123

Id.
Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (Can.). The Federal Court of Canada also
permits class actions.
125
See LAMONT & ETZOLD, supra note 12, at 35.
126
Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 66 B.L.R. 4th 222, at 5 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
127
Id.
128
Id. (―Liability follows proof of the misrepresentation, without the need to prove
reliance, subject to certain statutory defences.‖).
129
See infra Part IV.D.
124
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Stock Exchange and on other foreign securities exchanges but were not
traded on any exchanges in the United States. 130 National only had two
contacts in the United States: (1) the subsidiary HomeSide Lending
headquartered in Florida, and (2) American Depositary Receipts listed on
the NYSE.131 To the extent that a corporation chooses not to list its
securities on a U.S. exchange, it is difficult to justify subjecting them to the
laws of the United States. The differences among securities laws across
multiple countries are so material that a corporation cannot reasonably be
expected to act in accordance with regulations in jurisdictions in which it
chooses not to list its securities.
Many countries regulate their own exchanges, ―[a]nd the regulation of
other countries often differs from [the United States] as to what constitutes
fraud, what disclosures must be made, what damages are recoverable, . . .
and many other matters.‖132 In the United States, in order to establish a
cause of action under Section 10(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, the plaintiff
must show (1) that there is a misstatement or omission, (2) that the
misstatement or omission is material, (3) scienter, (4) a nexus between the
deceptive practice and the purchase or sale of a security, (5) the plaintiff
relied on the misstatement or omission, and (6) economic loss. 133 In the
United States, there is a presumption of reliance on the misstatement or
omission. This presumption, which was articulated in Basic v. Levinson, is
called the ―fraud-on-the-market theory.‖134 This theory establishes a
rebuttable presumption of reliance in securities fraud causes of action. 135
Other countries take markedly different approaches, however. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is
the non-governmental statutory authority responsible for the regulation of
the financial services industry in the United Kingdom. 136 The FSA
regulates most financial services markets, financial exchanges, and financial
firms.137 Its enforcement powers include the ability to:
[I]mpose penalties for a breach of its listing rules, disclosure rules,
prospectus rules or transparency rules; impose penalties for market
abuse; bring criminal proceedings for specified misleading
statements and practices; fine or censure authorized firms; apply for
an injunction where there is reasonable likelihood of contravention,
130

Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Id. at 2869.
132
Id. at 2885.
133
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
134
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225 (1988).
135
Id.
136
What We Do, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/
index.shtml (last updated Sept. 30, 2010). The FSA was created by the Financial Services
and Markets Act of 2000.
137
Id.
131
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or continuing contravention, of the FSMA; and order restitution
where any such provision has been contravened.138

Further understanding of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(FSMA) and the United Kingdom‘s common law illustrates the remedies
available for securities fraud in the United Kingdom. At common law,
liability may arise in instances of both misrepresentations and omissions
where there is a duty to disclose. 139 The FSMA statutory provisions provide
for causes of action in cases where an investor suffers a loss resulting from
any misrepresentation or omission where disclosure is required.140
Furthermore, similar to the United States‘ fraud-on-the-market theory,
―section 90 does not specify a requirement of ‗reliance.‘‖141
The requirements for fraud in the United Kingdom differ from those in
the United States in two primary ways. First, unlike the United States, the
FSMA does not require a showing of scienter.142 Second, the standard for
materiality differs between the two countries. In the United States, a
statement or omission is material if it ―may affect the desire of investors to
buy, sell, or hold the company‘s securities,‖143 and ―would have been
regarded by a ‗reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‗total
mix‘ of information available.‘‖144 Conversely, in the United Kingdom, the
standard for materiality depends on the type of corporate statement. 145
These differences in statutory construction among different nations
―reflect legitimate policy decisions‖ of each nation.146 Thus, the SEC
should consider the regulatory landscapes of foreign jurisdictions when
conducting its study of the application of extraterritoriality in securities
litigation. It is unreasonable to hold a company that only lists its securities
on a United Kingdom securities exchange and, in doing so, submits to the
regulations and jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, to U.S. securities
regulations as well. The opposite is also true. Corporations whose
securities are registered and traded only on U.S. exchanges should not be
expected to submit to the laws and regulations of foreign jurisdictions. The

138

Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 120, at 7–8 (citing FSMA Pt. VI, § 91;
FSMA Pt. VIII; FSMA Pt. XXVII, § 397; FSMA Pt. XIV; FSMA Pt. XXV, §§ 380-81;
FSMA Pt. XXV, §§ 382-84).
139
Id. at 8.
140
Id. (discussing § 90 of the FSMA).
141
Id. at 8–9.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 16 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
144
Id. (citing TSC Indus. Inc v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
145
PAUL DAVIES, DAVIES REVIEW OF ISSUER LIABILITY: LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS
TO THE MARKET: A DISCUSSION PAPER BY PROFESSOR PAUL DAVIES QC (March 2007),
http://www.treasurers.org/system/files/daviesdiscussion260307.pdf; see also Brief of the
United Kingdom, supra note 120, at 18.
146
Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 120, at 11.
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SEC should not want to invite other countries to pass similar extraterritorial
laws or for the United States to be accused of hypocrisy if it refuses to
submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign country.
3. International Comity
International comity is another concern that should weigh on the
SEC‘s consideration of extraterritoriality. International comity is the
principle of legal reciprocity,147 meaning the mutual exchange and
enforcement of privileges and judgments between nations. As a member of
the international community, the United States should respect state
sovereignty.148 Extraterritorial application of U.S. law ―disrespects foreign
sovereignty because it infringes upon the authority of nations to regulate
their own citizens and securities exchanges in the manner they see fit.‖149
Critics have asked how the United States would respond in a similar
situation—if a United States corporation were to be haled into a court in a
jurisdiction in which it has not consented to that jurisdiction‘s laws. In such
circumstances, the United States has typically objected to jurisdiction and
―threatened adverse consequences.‖150 For example, the international
community has tried to extend its laws to the United States, including those
of the International Criminal Court. The United States‘ ―position has long
been that even trial by an international tribunal, . . . would ‗imping[e] on the
sovereignty of the United States‘ to the extent that it would give others an
ability to second-guess U.S. policy decisions.‖151 If the SEC finds that the
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied to private rights of action
under Rule 10b-5, it risks injuring its international standing. 152
Like the United States, foreign ―[n]ations have a strong interest in
regulating their own financial markets, developing disclosure rules to
govern their own issuers, deciding how and when class action shareholder
litigation should occur and determining the penalties for violations of such
laws.‖153 As illustrated above, these interests vary among nations. An SEC
finding of extraterritoriality in private securities fraud claims would be a
direct violation of international comity and customary international law.
Well-established standards of international law clearly state that a nation

147

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/930442/
international-comity (last visited August 12, 2012).
148
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Organization for International Investment in Support of
Respondents at 7–8, Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08–
1191), 2010 WL 719335 [hereinafter Brief for Organization for International Investment].
149
Id. at 3.
150
Id. at 11.
151
Id. at 12 (citing JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31495, U.S. POLICY
REGARDING THE INT‘L CRIMINAL CT., 3–4 (2002)).
152
Id. at 12.
153
Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 120, at 22.

562

A Bright-Line Test for Extraterritoriality
32:541 (2012)

shall not exert jurisdiction over persons or activities of another nation if
such a finding of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. 154 A finding of
jurisdiction in F-Cubed or F-Squared cases is unreasonable because it could
potentially subject corporations to laws that are inconsistent with those of
the country whose laws they have chosen.
D. Economic Consequences
The unpredictable and inconsistent application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in U.S. courts may lead to a number of negative economic
consequences. For example, the lack of a bright-line rule may deter foreign
investment in the United States. As the Court recognized in Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, ―predictability is valuable to corporations making business and
investment decisions.‖155 A corporation is unlikely to conduct business in a
country where the effect of the laws on the corporation is unpredictable and
its application inconsistent. In fact, in the time period leading up to
Morrison, more than sixty foreign companies left U.S. capital markets. 156
154
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
jurisdiction is unreasonable is determined by evaluating the following factors:

Whether

(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
155

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010); see also First Nat. City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983) (recognizing the ―need
for certainty and predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expectations
of parties with interests in the corporation‖).
156
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, THE TERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS
AFTER MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 3–4 (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.sullcrom.
com/files/Publication/e82481b6-957a-44c2-a894-335409d295ef/Presentation/PublicationAtt
achment/befe45a9-05e5-485f-92e4-365755c5c1a4/SC_Publication_The_Territorial_Reach_
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During the two-year period between June 2007 and June 2009, ―15 out of
27 French companies listed in the United States at the end of 2005 had delisted, as had 19 of 44 United Kingdom companies, seven of 20 German
companies, six of 11 Italian companies, and 15 of 24 Australian
companies.‖157
A number of reasons have been given for this flight. First, the SEC, in
June 2007, ―amended its rules to remove certain barriers to de-listing.‖158
This made it easier for foreign companies who feared U.S. litigation to
leave U.S. capital markets, and thus, decrease their risk of being the target
of securities litigation in the United States. Second, the monetary awards in
private anti-fraud litigation increased. 159 In 2009, the average settlement
was $38 million, a 65% increase over the $23.1 million figure in 2008.160
This increased the potential economic consequences for a foreign company
choosing to list its securities on a U.S. exchange.
Third, foreign companies fear the possibility of duplicate recovery. 161
This possibility, however, is not a significant fear because ―these concerns
may be dealt with through interlocutory motions about group definition so
that a participant in one class action is excluded from another,‖162 or
through a waiver and release from future claims. In In re Royal Ahold N.V.
Securities and ERISA Litigation, the plaintiffs were required to ―release any
claims against the specified defendants and a variety of related persons,
covenant not to sue the specific defendants, and waive all claims related to
the subject matter of the settlement.‖163 Such a release in similar cases
would render the issue of duplicate recovery moot.
After analyzing the factors above—legislative history, public policy
justifications, international consequences, and economic consequences—the
SEC should not modify Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act to include
of_US_Securities_Laws.pdf; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Policeman to the
World? The Cost of Global Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2008, at 5 (―[W]hile the press
and others attribute the growing disenchantment of foreign issuers with the U.S. market to
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, closer analysis and interview data suggests that fear of U.S. private
antifraud litigation may be the better explanation [for the flight of foreign companies from
U.S. capital markets].‖).
157
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 156, at 4.
158
Id.
159
LAMONT & ETZOLD, supra note 12, at 39.
160
Id.
161
Ross Buckley, The Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Class Actions, 83
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 373, 375 (2009) (―If class actions are provided for in the foreign
jurisdiction, there is a possibility of overlap as claims can be brought in the US court and a
court in another country giving rise to double recovery or forum shopping.‖); see also Tanya
J. Monestier, Is Canada the New Shangri-La of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 Nw. J.
INT‘L L. & BUS. 305 (2012).
162
Id.
163
Saparoff & Beattie, supra note 109, at 675; see generally In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec.
& ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md. 2004).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction.
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR A NEW BRIGHT-LINE TEST
The SEC should establish a clearly defined bright-line rule regarding
the extraterritorial application of Section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 in private causes of action. The SEC should formally reject the
unpredictable conduct and effects tests created by the Second Circuit and
adopted in various forms by the other circuits, 164 and instead adopt language
that is consistent with the transaction-based test in Morrison. Additionally,
the SEC should further clarify the definition of what constitutes the
purchase of a security; more specifically, the SEC should define the level of
activity in the United States necessary for a security to be considered
purchased in the United States. Lastly, while not directly related to civil FCubed litigation, the SEC and Congress should reconsider the
extraterritoriality of enforcement actions brought by the SEC and the
Department of Justice.
In Morrison, the Court held that Section 10(b) ―reaches the use of a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.‖165 The SEC
should recommend the adoption of similar language, construing Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to only apply to those securities that are bought or
sold on an American exchange. If the security is not listed or traded on an
American exchange, the SEC should look to the issuer‘s principal place of
business as well as where the investor and the issuer consummated the
transaction.
To determine the location of the consummation of the transaction, the
courts should consider a number of relevant factors. These factors include
whether the purchaser is a resident of the United States, whether a broker or
underwriter located in the United States was used in the transaction, and
whether U.S. mails or wire services were used in the purchase or sale of the
security. None of these factors is dispositive, but the courts should conduct
a balancing of the factors. For example, if all three of the factors are
answered in the affirmative, a court may find that the purchase or sale of the
security took place in the United States.
The SEC has the authority to regulate American exchanges, but should
not regulate foreign corporations who choose to list only on foreign
exchanges. The SEC has an interest in protecting American markets—and
thereby American citizens—from fraud both at home and abroad. Adoption
of the transactional test is the best means to achieve this interest. Under
such test, a foreign corporation that chooses to list its securities on a U.S.
164
165

See supra Part II.
Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010).
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exchange will be subject to the laws of the Exchange Act.
Additionally, the SEC‘s adoption of the transaction-based test respects
state sovereignty and follows principals of international comity by
regulating only those transactions where either the security is traded on an
American exchange or the purchase or sale of the security takes place in the
United States. The test also creates a predictable and consistent rule for
courts to apply. In addition, it preserves the United States‘ interests in
protecting American exchanges from fraudulent activity. This is true
because, under the test, all securities traded on American exchanges or
purchased or sold in the United States, whether issued by U.S. corporations
or foreign corporations, fall under U.S. securities laws.
The bright line test must also include a clear definition of when the
purchase of a security takes place in the United States. The district court in
Plumbers‘ Union considered this issue in depth.166 The plaintiffs argued
that a purchase occurs ―when and where an investor places a buy order.‖167
The court stated that ―as a general matter, a purchase order in the United
States for a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient to
subject the purchase‖ to the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act.168
The court looked to a number of matters in reaching this conclusion. First,
the plaintiffs did not claim that the purchase made in Chicago was
irrevocable, nor did they dispute the fact that the security purchase was
made on a foreign exchange.169 Second, the court emphasized that, if the
plaintiffs‘ reasoning were accepted, it would require a fact-based, case-bycase inquiry into when and where the investor‘s purchase order became
irrevocable.170 An inquiry such as this would inevitably lead to inconsistent
rulings—exactly the kind the Court in Morrison was trying to avoid. To
avoid this problem, the SEC should provide clear and concise guidance as
to when and where a security purchase occurs.
Lastly, for these same reasons, the SEC should consider codifying the
transactional test in enforcement actions brought by the SEC and the
Department of Justice. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 929P provides
for extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where there is either significant
conduct in the United States or where the foreign conduct has a substantial
effect in the United States.171 Congress and the SEC should reconsider
whether subjecting foreign issuers, whose securities are not listed on an

166
See Plumbers‘ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.
Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
167
Id. at 177 (where the purchase order in question was placed in Chicago and the
security purchased was traded on the Swiss stock exchange).
168
Id. at 178.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010).
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American exchange, to U.S. securities laws and regulation is in line with
customary international law. Based on a balancing of the reasons discussed
above for finding that there should be no private cause of action in ForeignCubed cases, the same analysis supports the conclusion that the SEC should
not apply the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act extraterritorially to
SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
United States jurisdiction over Foreign-Cubed cases has been the
subject of much discourse among the international community.
Traditionally, American courts have asserted jurisdiction for one of two
reasons: (1) because the fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States;
or (2) because the fraudulent conduct had a substantial effect on the United
States. While the two tests seem clear in theory, the district courts‘
applications of the conduct and effects tests have been unpredictable and
inconsistent.
Additionally, the international community strongly opposes the
application of U.S. securities law on foreign corporations, especially those
who intentionally choose not to list their securities on American exchanges.
Foreign jurisdictions oppose the application of extraterritoriality in U.S.
securities litigation for a number of reasons, including the existence of their
own securities laws in their home countries, and international comity.
In June 2010, the United States Supreme Court in Morrison rejected
the conduct and effects tests and adopted a transactional test, which looks to
whether the fraud was committed in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security on an American exchange. However, the Dodd-Frank Act, which
was passed in July 2010, put the ball back into the SEC‘s court. The DoddFrank Act commissioned the SEC to conduct a study and make a
recommendation regarding the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.172 This article argues that the SEC should
consider a number of factors, including the legislative and judicial history
of the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the policy reasons
for and against extraterritoriality, and the international and economic
consequences of extraterritoriality. Finally, this article recommends that the
SEC adopt a bright-line test that mirrors the test adopted by the Supreme
Court in Morrison. Additionally, this article recommends that Congress
and the SEC reconsider the extraterritorial application in SEC and
Department of Justice enforcement actions when foreign issuers who do not
trade their shares on American exchanges are involved.

172

Id. § 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871.
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